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IAC-M-276  
29 January 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Minutes of Meeting Held in  
IAC Conference Room, Administration Building  
Central Intelligence Agency, at 1045, 29 January 1957

Director of Central Intelligence  
Allen W. Dulles  
Presiding\*

Deputy Director (Intelligence), CIA  
Robert Amory, Jr.  
Presiding\*

M E M B E R S   P R E S E N T

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence,  
Department of State  
Major General Robert A. Schow, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,  
Department of the Army  
Rear Admiral Laurence H. Frost, Director of Naval Intelligence,  
Department of the Navy  
Colonel R. A. Breitweiser, acting for Director of Intelligence,  
Headquarters, United States Air Force  
Brigadier General Richard Collins, Deputy Director for Intelligence,  
The Joint Staff  
Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission representative  
to the IAC  
Mr. Ralph R. Roach, acting for Federal Bureau of Investigation  
representative to the IAC

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\* Part of meeting

Army, OSD and State Department  
review(s) completed.

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IAC-M-276

29 January 1957

1. Approval of Minutes  
23 January Meeting  
(IAC-M-275)

Approved as written.

2. Review of Crisis Situations

a. Watch Committee Report  
No. 338

Noted this report.

b. Algerian Situation

The members noted a report by the Army on this situation, dated 25 January, which had been circulated to the members prior to the meeting. General Schow emphasized that the principal purpose of the paper was to show the trend in the military position, particularly the possibility of the French military taking unilateral action without approval of the French Government, including a possible military coup. After a discussion of this matter, the Chairman noted that he proposed to brief the NSC on this situation, taking into account the Army memorandum and other relevant information brought to his attention in the next few days.

c. The members also exchanged views on the situation in Sumatra, a report referring to possible shifts in certain Soviet troop dispositions and a recent statement by Chou En-lai with respect to an exchange of prisoners with the US.

3. Review of Procedures of  
Watch Committee and  
National Indications Center  
(IAC-D-6/15, 25 January)

The members and [ ] Director, National Indications Center (NIC), discussed this matter, with particular reference to nature of the problems specifically outlined in the memorandum from 25X1

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the Chairman, Watch Committee (IAC-D-6/15), and arrangements being made for overcoming them. Following their discussion the members concurred in the recommendation of the Watch Committee that it report to the IAC at the end of three months the progress achieved in dealing with these and any other problems of procedure that may arise.

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SECRETARY'S NOTES

1. No objection having been raised by a member, the Secretary has authorized release to USIA of NIE 34-57, "The Outlook for Iran," 23 January 1957 (IAC-M-275, Secretary's Note 1).



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IAC Meeting, 29 January 1957

ALSO PRESENT

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Sherman Kent

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Mr. Herbert Scoville, Jr.

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Department of State

Mr. John Evans

Mr. Robert D. Baum

Department of the Army

Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Pratt

Lieutenant Colonel Eugene T. Seaburn

Major Philip H. Dunbar

Mr. Jonathan D. Stoddart

Department of the Navy

Captain William S. Howell

Department of the Air Force

Colonel W. B. Sawyer

Lieutenant Colonel V. A. Woods, Jr.

Lieutenant Colonel G. H. Wilson

The Joint Staff

Colonel E. G. Van Orman  
Colonel Charles H. Dayhuff, Jr.  
Colonel Ernest P. Foley  
Colonel Robert H. Stumpf

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
Washington 25, D. C.

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ACSI-PRC

25 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ATTENTION: Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee  
Room 114, Administrative Building


SUBJECT: The Algerian Situation (U)

1. Attached herewith is a summary of some of the cogent military factors pertinent to Algeria.

2. It is suggested that the Intelligence Advisory Committee note the inclosure.

3. It is not believed that a Special National Intelligence Estimate is necessary at this time.

1 Incl:  
a/s

  
H. J. LEMLEY, JR.  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Production Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
Washington 25, D. C.

POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN ALGERIA (U)

1. Current Security Situation

a. The character of the revolt in Algeria has increased in intensity since its inception in the Aures Mountain area of eastern Algeria on 1 November 1954. This is best demonstrated by the marked increase in the scale of the French effort devoted to its suppression.

"Comparison of French Army Strength  
June 1954 to 25 January 1957"

	<u>Army Strength</u>	<u>Divisions</u>	<u>Regiments</u>	<u>Battalions</u>
1 June 1954	64,000	1	4	6
25 January 1957	340,000*	13	42	64

\* Gendarmerie, naval and air elements bring the total French military force in Algeria to approximately 400,000.

b. During this same period the organization, tactics, strength and armament of the rebels have continued to improve despite substantial losses to the French. Army Intelligence currently estimates that there are between 10,000 to 20,000 armed regular members of the National Liberation Army (NLA) in Algeria who can draw upon as many as 30,000 auxiliaries or part time rebels. Behind this group stands the great majority

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of the Moslem population who, either because of ideological identification or intimidation, are ready to provide supplies, intelligence, and other forms of support to the rebel bands. The rebel arms inventory, according to a



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The attack of 16 January on French military headquarters in Algiers was executed with two bazookas.

c. Despite the magnitude of the French military effort in Algeria there has been no substantial improvement in the security situation in recent months. The great influx of French reinforcements, numbering 128,000 men, between May and August 1956 led to French hopes that the Algerian problem could be resolved by the weight of numbers by late 1956. Although some progress was made in July and August in limiting large-scale guerrilla activity French hopes of early termination of the revolt were dispelled by an upswing in terrorist activity in September. The pacification program, while limiting the activity of guerrilla bands, has not eradicated armed resistance in the rural areas, particularly in the Aures-Nementcha area in the east, the Kabylie, the area south of Algiers and in the western and southwestern areas contiguous to the Moroccan border. In the towns, and especially in Algiers, terrorist activities have increased in tempo.

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d. The military problems of the French in combatting the Algerian nationalists have been compounded by the adverse effects of the Suez situation, and the Parliamentary difficulties of the Mollet Government plus a number of other collateral current problems. The use



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The growing rigidity in the colon and nationalists' positions was not improved following Premier Mollet's policy statement of 10 January which implied the development of Algerian autonomy but insisted that the French would not leave Algeria. A number of reports have indicated that the situation in Algeria will come to a head in the next few weeks. It is fairly well established that the forthcoming discussions in the United Nations General Assembly will lead to the calling of an eight-day general strike by the FLN. If the Moslems respond it is likely that French elements will react violently to such a move. Some sources have indicated that the French Army will support the "Colons" in defiance of constitutional authority and might even stage a military coup in France.



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The military, which have been the prime instrument of Resident General Robert Lacost's administration, has become increasingly involved in administrative, as well as military functions. This has been manifested on several levels of Government. Major General Marie Gouraud, Commanding General of the 27th Alpine Division in Algeria, informed Army Intelligence representatives on 16 January that over 300 French officers are now occupying administrative positions in Algeria. Brigadier General Jacques Massu, a paratroop commander most recently engaged in the Suez operation, was charged in early January with maintaining order in the Algiers area.

b. It is quite apparent that a clear danger exists that, as the French military become more involved in the local situation in Algeria, it ultimately will cease to be an impartial agent of the Government and will come to identify its interests with those of the colon extremists. However, Army Intelligence believes that this danger is not immediate. While many junior officers and noncommissioned officers probably could be influenced to support violence on the part of the colons it is believed that the tradition of responsibility to Constitutional authority is sufficiently strong among the senior commanders to preclude any attempt to stage a coup as long as the French Government demonstrates its intention to maintain control over Algeria. The reaction of the military in event of a drastic change in Government policy involving an abandonment of Algeria cannot be estimated at this time.

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